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GUARDING THE SUBJECTIVE PREMIUM:  
CONDEMNATION RISK DISCOUNTS IN THE HOUSING MARKET 
Sebastien Gay and Nadia Nasser-Ghodsi1 
We propose the condemnation risk discount theory, whereby home buyers deduct a discount from 
housing prices in the absence of insurance against the risk that the government will condemn 
their property for private transfer. Homeowners cannot separate out the negative risk that their 
home will be condemned from the positive effect that high-value redevelopment projects may 
have on the surrounding area. There are, consequently, competing effects of the risk of eminent 
domain on fair market value.  
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invaluable feedback. We would also like to thank Legislator Shannon LaFrance for her helpful insights on state and 
local legislative activities following Kelo v. City of New London in New York.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Michael Cristofaro’s family had two homes condemned by the City of New London as 
part of the 2000 Fort Trumbull Municipal Development Plan. The project included plans to build 
new housing, a hotel, restaurant, conference and athletic centers, and a bioscience office park on 
the River Thames shoreline area.2 When recently interviewed about his experience, Mr. 
Cristofaro insisted “[i]t wasn’t about the money. . . . This was our home.”3 He explained that he 
and the other property owners who refused to sell their homes were treated as if they were 
stonewalling economic development.4 The dispute was ultimately resolved by the Supreme Court 
in the infamous Kelo v. City of New London,5 decision, which upheld the City’s redevelopment 
plan as a valid taking under the Fifth Amendment. In the aftermath of the ruling, the City has 
struggled to get the redevelopment project off the ground.6 Despite the developer’s promise of 
building rental units with “Greek Revival and Italianate facades” and “interiors with a Japanese 
contemporary flair,”7 the City and the developer are headed to mediation—thirteen years later—
to resolve financing problems.8 For now, the residents of New London see only an empty site 
and hear about future plans.9  
Mr. Cristofaro takes solace in the fact that the City of New London’s saga motivated 
homeowners around the country to fight against eminent domain. “[T]hey got off their couches 
and did something,” he said. “Because of our case, people have been allowed to stay in their 
homes.”10 Indeed, forty-four states responded to Kelo by enacting new or stronger legislation to 
protect homeowners against the risk of a taking. We provide for the first time an empirical 
analysis of the effect of the Kelo decision and subsequent state legislation on housing prices.  
We argue in Part I that eminent domain laws have two potentially competing effects on housing 
prices through the home buyer’s “condemnation risk discount” and the relevant real estate 
market value. Home buyers include the risk of eminent domain—and the potential losses caused 
by under-compensation through “fair market value”—in the closing price of their properties as a 
discount.11 Fair market value of the property simultaneously may rise or fall depending on the 
expectation that eminent domain projects are efficient; that is, whether they will yield positive 
redevelopment or the City of New London’s empty lots in the relevant real estate market. 
In Part II, we examine the Kelo decision and national response within the framework of 
the condemnation risk discount and relevant real estate market theories. We argue that Kelo 
should have caused an increase in condemnation risk discounts, given the concern over increased 
usage of eminent domain in each state. Turning to state legislative responses, we expect that 
homeowners’ condemnation risk discounts should have declined, on average, commensurate to 
the strength of their legislatures’ assurances that they would not replicate the City of New 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Kathleen Edgecomb, ‘It still hurts’: Fight to save home scars one Fort Trumbull family, The Day, at 2 (June 23, 
2013). City of New London Website, available at http://www.ci.new-london.ct.us/content/29/default.aspx (last 
visited February 28, 2014).  
3 Edgecomb, It still hurts, at 2. 
4 Id.  
5 545 U.S. 469 (U.S. 2005). 
6 Kathleen Edgecomb, City says Fort Trumbull development delayed, The Day, at 1 (May 17, 2013). 
7 Vision & Plans: New London 2013 and Beyond, New London Landmarks, available online at 
http://www.newlondonlandmarks.org/visionsPlans.htm (last visited November 8, 2013). 
8 Edgecomb, It still hurts, at 3. 
9 Id.  
10 Id.  
11 Another way to think about this concept is the price to transform an unwilling to seller into a willing seller.  
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London development plan. Assuming the efficient usage of eminent domain for private transfer, 
we contend that Kelo should cause an increase in the relevant real estate market, but that any 
increases may have been undone by strong anti-Kelo legislation.  
We test our condemnation risk discount theory in Part III and show that the empirical 
results are consistent with our theory. Kelo had a statistically significant negative impact on the 
change in housing prices across the nation. We further demonstrate that home prices responded 
negatively with statistical significance to state legislation following Kelo; that is, the stronger the 
state’s response against Kelo, the greater the negative impact on the change in housing prices. 
Those states that took no action against the decision experienced an increase in housing prices, 
largely recouping the losses caused by the initial shock of Kelo.  
 
PART I: HOME VALUATION – AN ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK 
The Kelo poster children are the elderly husband and wife who spent their married lives 
together in their home and are suddenly informed that their property has been condemned for a 
corporate redevelopment project and offered the fair-market value in exchange. 12 Such an 
outcome strikes fear in the heart of any warm-blooded homeowner. Legal scholars have argued 
that fair-market value undercompensates the elderly couple, focusing on the sense of autonomy 
and sentimental value that is lost in the cold economic calculation.13 We propose a modified 
framework to understand the elderly couple’s predicament by offering the condemnation risk 
discount theory, suggesting that the market has integrated the risk of under-compensation in 
housing prices.14 We then explore the competing effects on home valuation through the potential 
benefits of eminent domain.  
A. Subjective Premium 
The Fifth Amendment requires the government to pay a condemnee “just compensation,” 
which is generally measured as the property’s fair market value.15 The fair market value, in turn, 
is calculated by estimating “what a willing buyer would pay in cash to a willing seller.”16 There 
is a natural intuition that this calculation misses something critical, given that a seller who is 
forced to sell to the government is, by definition, not willing.17 This gap in calculation is 
described in the literature as the subjective premium.18 The subjective premium is the additional 
amount of money a homeowner would be willing to accept to sell her home at fair market value.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 475 (U.S. 2005) (“Petitioner Wilhelmina Dery was born in her Fort 
Trumbull house in 1918 and has lived there her entire life. Her husband Charles (also a petitioner) has lived in the 
house since they married some 60 years ago.”).  
13 See, e.g., Brian Angelo Lee, Just Undercompensation: The Idiosyncratic Premium in Eminent Domain, 113 
C.L.M.L.R. 593 (2013); Lee Anne Fennell, Taking Eminent Domain Apart, 2004 Mich. St. L. Rev. 957 (2004); 
Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Neglected Political Economy of Eminent Domain, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 101 (2006) 
(examining the dignitary harms arising in private transfer takings). 
14 See, e.g., James E. Krier & Christopher Serkin, Public Ruses, 2004 Mich. St. L. Rev. 859, 866 (2004). 
15 United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 25-26 (1984).  
16 United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943).  
17 See, e.g., Krier and Serkin, 2004 Mich. L. Rev. at 866 (“The difficulty, of course, is that in condemnation cases 
the sellers are not willing at all, however eager the buyers happen to be.”) 
1818 Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 61, 83 (1986). 
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Subjective premium can be calculated by measuring the difference between the owner’s 
value of her property (her reservation price) and the market’s value of the property (fair market 
value).19 Its movement is subject to private information20 and is not necessarily correlated with 
the property’s market value. The subjective premium may increase in time as positive memories 
are accumulated in the home, such as the birth of a child or the achievement of professional 
accomplishments. Conversely, there may be a sudden drop in subjective premium if negative 
personal experiences occur there.  
It is important to distinguish between those negative personal experiences that cause a 
decline in subjective premium and those that may simultaneously decrease subjective premium 
and fair market value. Depending on the jurisdiction, a home seller may have a duty to disclose 
the fact that a house may be haunted21; that a murder22 or death23 took place; or that a previous 
owner was significantly indebted to prepare for harassing calls or creditor visits.24 Even if there 
is no duty to disclose, the fact of certain negative characteristics may negatively impact the fair 
market value. The subjective premium does not need to track these outcomes and, even if it 
follows in tandem, the decrease does not need to be the same amount as the fair market value 
decrease. When the homeowner is prepared to put her home on the market, her subjective 
premium is zero. Any value greater than zero signifies that the homeowner is not on the market. 
The higher the subjective premium, the greater the resistance to condemnation. 
 
B. Condemnation Risk Discount 
Given the well-understood under-compensation problem in the eminent domain context, 
the question arises: Where is the insurance market for the subjective premium? Eminent domain 
insurance has been proposed to provide home owners protection against the risk of regulatory 
takings.25 At least one insurance company considered offering similar coverage for physical 
takings to California residents.26 These insurance market proposals are predicated on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 See, e.g., Krier and Serkin, 2004 Mich. L. Rev. at 866 (“The difficulty, of course, is that in condemnation cases 
the sellers are not willing at all, however eager the buyers happen to be. They are unwilling precisely because, 
absent some statutory provision, they are not compensated for moving expenses, loss of goodwill, consequential 
damages, nor, most importantly, loss of consumer surplus-which is to say the amount by which an owner values 
property over and above its fair market value. That amount, especially significant in the case of residential property, 
has to be positive, for otherwise owners would already have sold their holdings on the market.”) 
20 Private information is available for potential buyers for all of the possible disclosures on a home, but in the case of 
eminent domain revealing any private information is not necessary. Nonetheless a potential buyer would rely on 
public information to access this risk. It is clear that a neighborhood insider would be more likely to know to check 
the potential risk of eminent domain if it exists in a given neighborhood. 
21 Stambovsky v.Ackley, 572 N.Y.S.2d 672 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991). 
22 Reed v. King, 193 Cal. Rptr. 130 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983). 
23 Kleinfield v. McNally, (N.Y. Co. Sup. Ct. 1988). 
24 See generally Cal. Civ. Code § 1710.2; Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 38–35.5–101; Conn. Gen. Stat. § 20–329dd; Del. 
Code Ann. tit. 24, § 2930; Fla. Stat. § 689.25; Ga. Code Ann. § 44–1–16; Haw. Rev. Stat. § 467–14(18); Idaho Code 
§ 55–2802; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 207.250; La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 37:1468; Md. Code Ann., Real Prop. § 2–120; Mo. 
Ann. Stat. § 442.600; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 47–13–2; Okla. Stat. tit. 59, § 858–513; Or. Rev. Stat. § 93.275; R.I. Gen. 
Laws § 5–20.8–6; S.C. Code Ann. § 27–50–90; S.D. Codified Laws § 43–4–44; Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 5.008(c); 
Utah Code Ann. § 57–1–37; Va. Code Ann. § 55–524. 
25 Steve Calandrillo, Should ‘Just Compensation’ Be Abolished, and Would ‘Takings Insurance’ Work Instead?, 64 
Ohio State L. J. 451 (2003). 
26 John Coupal, Insurance Company to Offer Eminent Domain Insurance, available at 
http://www.hjta.org/california-commentary/insurance-company-offer-eminent-domain-insurance (last visited 
February 28, 2014). 
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difference between fair market value and the compensation provided by the government, 
however, not on the subjective premium. The problem for insuring the subjective premium is that 
it is, by definition, subjective, and impossible to verify in an insurance claim process.27 Real 
property insurance is generally founded on fair market value, which will not help the condemnee 
who seeks more than fair market value to cover her loss. In some instances outside the real 
property context, there are “agreed value insurance” policies, but those would also fail the 
homeowner if her subjective premium has increased since agreeing to the policy. There is 
consequently no formal insurance available to cover sentimental value, in the real estate context 
or elsewhere.28 
In the absence of formal, structured insurance plans, home buyers can deduct a 
condemnation risk discount from the closing sale price. We argue that this discount serves as an 
intertemporal transfer by the homeowner, such that her subjective premium is not entirely lost.  
The homeowner compensates herself at closing for the expected loss of her subjective premium 
at the time of condemnation. Suppose that we consider a rational risk-averse agent that could sell 
her home at price R (reservation price) if she wants to sell.29  There is a probability p that the 
government will decide to condemn her house.  In that case, she can only sell her house for fair 
market value.  Therefore, she would want to enter into a contract with an insurance company that 
would ex-ante offer her insurance to make sure she receives the same marginal utility in both 
states of the world (condemnation and non-condemnation).  
Upon first consideration, one might think that the condemnation risk discounts reflect all 
eminent domain usage, not private transfer in particular. The argument is that subjective 
premium is equally lost where the property is subsequently used for a hotel as it is for a public 
park.  While the condemnation risk discount may pick up some amount of protection against 
idiosyncratic eminent domain usage, we argue that the discount is largely limited to private 
transfers because of the unique inability of homeowners to avoid such condemnation risks. If a 
home buyer is uniquely risk-averse, she can purchase a home far away from major roads to avoid 
the risk of a highway expansion. If she is concerned about the possibility that a town may want 
to create additional parks through eminent domain, she choose a town saturated in parks or a 
community with truly blighted areas that could benefit from restored public spaces. She can 
avoid a finding of blight for her own property by maintaining it.  
Private transfer is a different type of risk, primarily because the municipality’s underlying 
calculus in pursuing private transfer is mainly based on increasing the tax base.30 Private transfer 
for economic development will almost always increase the tax base: Substituting one home for 
many condominiums, for example, will necessarily increase tax revenues for the city. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 See, e.g., Philip J. Cook and Daniel A. Graham, The Demand for Insurance and Protection: The Case of 
Irreplaceable Commodities, 91 Q. J. Econ. 143 (1977) (arguing that owners “will  typically  not  fully  insure  an  
irreplaceable  commodity  and  may  even  choose  to  bet  against  losing  it”). 
28 See, e.g., David Markell, et. al., What’s Love Got To Do With It? Sentimental Attachments and Legal Decision-
Making, 57 Vill. L. Rev. 209, 222 (2012) (“In short, sentimental value, defined broadly to include the endowment 
effect, information acquisition, and traditional or popular notions of sentimental value, may be very difficult to place 
a monetary amount on due to differences in subjective perception, both across contexts (are you the owner or the 
would-be purchaser) and within contexts (you may value the home you grew up in more than I do).”). 
29 She could potentially sell at any price higher than R, but we will suppose she sells at price R to simplify the 
analysis. 
30 Rebecca Leung, Eminent Domain: Being Abused? CBS, Sep. 26, 2003, available at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/eminent-domain-being-abused/ (last visited February 28, 2014) (quoting a 60 
Minutes interview with the Mayor of Lakewood who “told 60 Minutes that she sought out a developer for the 
project because Lakewood's aging tax base has been shrinking and the city simply needs more money.”) 
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Homeowners therefore lack defensive actions to protect against this risk, unlike with more 
“classic” public uses.31 It is this lack of alternatives on the part of the homeowner to protect 
against private transfer that necessitates a condemnation risk discount in the housing market.  
The condemnation risk discount should be contrasted with the idea that laws generally 
may impact housing prices.32 Milani argues that housing prices may fluctuate in response to 
changes in local laws “because more people want to live there.”33 This theory serves as a 
compelling method for evaluating a law’s utility. In the eminent domain context, however, the 
condemnation risk discount is not a function of homeowners “voting with their feet,” but is a 
reflection of an unavailable insurance market. Unlike other laws that can have significant 
financial impact on voters, such as tort reform and employment law,34 in the eminent domain 
context the expected loss is so small that it is unlikely to motivate an otherwise stationary 
homeowner. It can be expected to impact housing prices on the margin and the choice of 
neighborhood for a home buyer already motivated to purchase.   
The home buyer’s condemnation risk discount is dependent on two primary variables: her 
expected subjective premium (M) and her expected likelihood of condemnation (p). Supposing 
that she is her own risk neutral insurance company, she will want to pay a premium P such that 𝑃 = 𝑝.𝑀,35 This premium P is the condemnation risk discount. 
Expected subjective premium can be calculated by first estimating the expected amount 
of time the home buyer will remain in the home. For example, first-time home buyers generally 
move out faster than trade-up buyers; in fact, it generally takes about thirteen years for half of all 
first-time buyers to move out of their homes, which is two years faster than general home 
buyers.36 By contrast, it takes seventeen-years for trade-up buyers to meet that threshold.37 Home 
buyers can therefore estimate the length of time they will remain in the home and the 
corresponding subjective premium fluctuations that may occur over time.  
The greater difficulty for the home buyer is calculating the likelihood of condemnation. It 
is exceedingly rare to find a governmental entity that maintains careful usage data. In the absence 
of publicly-available condemnation statistics, homeowners rationally rely on signals to estimate 
the likelihood of condemnation, most importantly public reporting—what we call “information 
flare-ups”—and changing legislation.38  
We define an information flare-up as a spike in public reporting of eminent domain, 
where the spike mischaracterizes the fact that eminent domain for private transfer is more 
consistently exercised. Information flare-ups reveal the degree of negative publicity that a 
condemning entity is willing and able to withstand. Moreover, it may suggest that the local 
government uses eminent domain regularly in more politically palatable contexts that do not gain 
local or national coverage, which in turn undermines the homeowner’s historical estimation of 
the likelihood of condemnation. When the flare up subsides, it may cause homeowners to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Krier and Serkin, 2004 Mich. L. Rev. at 861. 
32 See, for example, Milani, Valuing Laws as Local Amenities, 121(5) Harv. L. Rev. 1273 (2008).   
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 1315. 
35 We suppose that the insurance company is risk neutral. 
36 Paul Emrath, How Long Buyers Remain in Their Homes, National Association of Home Builders, Feb. 11, 2009, 
available at http://www.nahb.org/generic.aspx?genericContentID=110770&channelID=311 (last visited February 
28, 2014). 
37 Id. 
38 Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q. J. Econ. 355 (1973); G.J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 
J. Pol. Econ, 213 (1961); G.J. Stigler, The Theory of Price, 3rd ed. (1966). 
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mistakenly infer that eminent domain activity has slowed down.  A flare up may distort 
condemnation risk discounts through a phenomenon called availability bias, which is an 
individual’s estimation of the likelihood of condemnation based on how easily she can think of 
an example of it having occurred, detached from the actual likelihood of the risk.39 The effect of 
Kelo as perhaps the most significant flare-up in recent eminent domain action history is 
discussed in greater detail in Part II, below. Local flare-ups occur more regularly, and serve as a 
constantly updating signal on the locality’s usage of eminent domain. Applied to housing 
decision-making, availability bias will tend to add some potential irrationality in the short-run 
but in the long run this bias could be smoothed out into rationality by adding more relevant 
information.40  
 Home owners also rely on changes or expected changes in the legal landscape to 
calculate the risk of eminent domain. The home buyer will have over- and under-estimated her 
condemnation risk discount if the eminent domain laws or usage rates change in the time period 
between when she purchased her home and when her property is condemned or when she puts it 
on the market for resale. If, for example, there was a high likelihood of condemnation when she 
purchased her home, the home buyer may have secured a lower price. When the laws tighten 
against condemnation, the home buyer enjoys a higher resale price. Conversely, if that home 
buyer purchased her home during a time where the risk of condemnation was low, she may have 
factored in a very low condemnation risk discount. If there is panic about the risk of eminent 
domain or the laws relax at a later point in time, the home buyer will bear the loss of the change 
in law. Therefore the homebuyer would get more of a transfer of wealth if the risk of eminent 
domain is low.  Overall note that the net gain for both should be zero as the market would end up 
at an equilibrium for a given house to be sold. 
Kelo can be understood not only as an information flare-up but also as an unreliable 
signal that the legal landscape may change. Homeowners may have anticipated that local 
governments were emboldened by the Supreme Court’s clear and unequivocal pronouncement 
that an economic redevelopment plan may be upheld under the Fifth Amendment. Once again, 
while Kelo’s effect on condemnation risk discounts should not be underestimated, it is by no 
means the only example of unsteady legal landscapes.41 The governor responded with an 
amendatory veto to the quick-take bill. We expect such dramatic swings in the legal landscape to 
cause concern for homeowners over how the dust will settle and, in turn, to impact condemnation 
risk discounts.  
 
C. Relevant Real Estate Market 
The risk of eminent domain cannot be understood in a vacuum nor should it be 
interpreted as a purely negative risk. While the homeowner in a nice home may want assurances 
that her property will not be unexpectedly condemned, she may not be opposed to the possibility 
that the unsightly apartments a few blocks away will be condemned and replaced with a high-
priced high rise building. Real estate is indeed affected by not only the behavior of a given 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Rabin Matthew, Psychology and Economics, 36 J. Econ. Lit. 11 (1998); Timur Kuran and Cass Sunstein, 
Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 683 (1999). 
40 Diederik A. Stapel, Stephen D. Reicher, and Russell Spears,  Contextual determinants of strategic choice: some 
moderators of the availability bias, 25 Eur. J. Soc. Psych. 141 (1995). 
41 The City of Aurora, Illinois, for example, developed a plan in 2000 to redevelop RiverCity. To expedite the 
process, the City secured approval from the Illinois legislature to use quick-take condemnation. Berliner, Public 
Power, Private Gain, at 65. 
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homeowner but by all of her surrounding neighborhood, what we would describe as the relevant 
real estate market.42 Most famously, perhaps, the power of eminent domain was wielded to 
revitalize the Ferry Building in San Francisco, Dudley Street in Boston, and Skyland Shopping 
Center in Washington, D.C, which increased home values in the surrounding areas.43 We 
conceptualize the relevant real estate market as the geographic zone that impacts a given 
property’s value. These eminent domain action risks represent the likelihood that the relevant 
real estate market will increase or decrease in value over time.  
Decreasing the likelihood that an individual homeowner’s property may be condemned is 
necessarily correlated  with a decreased likelihood that another homeowner’s property will be 
condemned for economic development, assuming general uniformity of risk of condemnation 
across residential homes. We envision eminent domain for private transfer to function like a 
tornado with an uncertain path that could hit anyone. The possibility that eminent domain can 
truly revitalize a community, thereby increasing surrounding housing prices along with the more 
direct benefits to those immediate impacted, should not be forgotten. One of the most positive 
stories is the Melrose Commons Urban Renewal Project from South Bronx, New York. The 
program was initially approved in 1988.44 After some delay, the project began to move forward 
in 1994.45 The original plan risked pricing out the low-income residents, but after extensive 
coalition work with homeowners, tenants, and businesses, new plans that included mixed-income 
housing were assembled.46 The 35-block area now includes approximately 2,000 mixed-income 
housing units, retail space, and parks.47 Once described as an “apocalyptic nightmare version of 
urban life,” the South Bronx is now considered “[o]ne of the greatest real estate turnarounds 
ever.”48 Home prices have increased ten-fold.49 Development is continuing, in light of the 
project’s tremendous success.50 
We therefore theorize that the effect of eminent domain risk should have competing 
effects on condemnation risk discounts and the relevant real estate market. When there is an 
increased risk in eminent domain, there should be a simultaneous increase in the value of the 
relevant real estate market and condemnation risk discounts, assuming proper functioning of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 We adopt the economic principles underlying relevant markets in the antitrust law context to the real estate 
market. See, for example, United States v E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956) (defining 
market power as “the power to control prices or exclude competition” in the relevant market, where the relevant 
market is defined by products that are “reasonably interchangeable by consumers for the same purposes”). 
See also R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & Econ. 1 (1960); G.J. Stigler, The Theory of Price, 3rd 
ed. (1966). (1966). 
43 Andrew W. Schwartz, Testimony Concerning The “Private Property Rights Protection Act of 2013”, (May 6, 
2013) available at http://www.smwlaw.com/files/U.S._House_of_Rep._Testimony.pdf (last visited February 28, 
2014). 
44 In re City of New York, 39 A.D.3d 131, 131 (N.Y.A.D. 1 Dept. 2007).  
45 Mervyn Rothstein, A Renewal Plan in the Bronx Advances, The New York Times, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/07/10/realestate/a-renewal-plan-in-the-bronx-
advances.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm (last visited February 28, 2014). 
46 Amy Lavine, Urban Renewal and the Story of Berman v. Parker, 42 Urb. L. 423, at n.26 (2010). 
47 Id. 
48 Les Christie, The Greatest Real Estate Turnaround Ever, CNN Money (Nov. 25, 2009), available at 
http://money.cnn.com/2009/11/09/real_estate/greatest_neighborhood_turnaround/ (last visited February 28, 2014). 
49 Id (noting, however, that “[e]ach property sold for between $50,000 and $59,000 even though it cost an average of 
$110,000 to build”). 
50 New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development, available at 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/hpd/html/buyers/nychome-neighborhoods-bronx-melrose.shtml (last visited February 28, 
2014). 
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eminent domain for private transfer. The prospect of large development projects increases fair 
market value through the potential for improved housing, retail, and associated economic gains. 
At the same time, it also increases the condemnation risk discount because there is heightened 
risk that the homeowner’s property will be condemned and, consequently, decreases housing 
prices.  
There is active debate over the marginal effect that eminent domain has on a state’s 
economy and real estate market, however, given that corporations are free to negotiate 
independently with homeowners to purchase larger tracts of land. Moreover, state and local 
governments can incentivize development projects through tax incentives, rezoning, and state 
economic development grants, to name a few.51 Opponents of eminent domain for private 
transfer point to successful redevelopment projects that—though slow to develop—revitalized 
communities.52 They further argue that eminent domain is too easy of a tool for local 
government, such that it incentivizes “inadequate planning and economic evaluation by 
governments and/or undue influence of special interests.”53 The question remains, therefore, 
whether eminent domain risk does, in fact, have a positive or negative effect on the housing 
market. If the increased risk of eminent domain causes homeowners to expect demolished homes 
and empty lots because it is inefficiently exercised, then it should trigger a decline in housing 
prices. Conversely, if an increase in the likelihood of eminent domain is positively integrated as 
a sign of higher-value redevelopment because it is efficiently used, then it should cause an 
increase in fair market value. Without the necessary information, the real estate market cannot 
properly estimate the likelihood that private transfer via eminent domain will yield the City of 
New London nightmare or the South Bronx dream. This information failure also throws into 
question whether redevelopers will move forward with their projects in an area that offers tax 
incentives instead of eminent domain or if they will relocate to an area that is friendly to private 
transfers via eminent domain. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Brief Amicus Curiae of John Norquist, Kelo v. City of New London (Dec. 3, 2004).  
52 Id.  
53 Id. at 9. 
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We represent the eminent domain tradeoffs using the following table: 
Table 1: Eminent Domain Trade-Offs 
    
Effect of Condemnation risk discount  
on Fair Market Value 
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As Table 1 shows, there are two scenarios in which the effects of condemnation risk discount 
and redevelopment plans will move in the same direction (the upper-left and lower-right boxes). 
In order for them to work together, the market must interpret redevelopment plans as 
inefficiently decided or effectuated. In other words, the market must expect a negative effect on 
fair market value arising out of a government’s redevelopment plans. An illustration will help 
clarify the point. If a local government restricts its ability to effectuate a private transfer using 
eminent domain and homeowners anticipate private transfer to result in a City of New London 
catastrophe, the restriction will increase fair market value by reducing the need for a 
condemnation risk discount. In addition, the restriction further increases fair market value by 
reducing the likelihood of demolished homes and empty lots. Conversely, if the government 
expands its ability, then there will be an increased need to insure against the loss of subjective 
premium, which causes a decrease in fair market value. This effect will be exacerbated by the 
negative effect on housing prices as homeowners brace for empty lots.  
In the other two scenarios (the lower-left and upper-right boxes), the effects are uncertain 
because the magnitude of the effects cannot be known without empirical analysis. These 
scenarios are caused by the market putting a positive expected value on a government’s 
redevelopment plan. As a result, if the government restricts its ability to effectuate a private 
transfer using eminent domain and homeowners anticipate private transfer to potentially result in 
greater value to the neighborhood, the restriction will increase fair market value by reducing the 
need for a condemnation risk discount. The restriction will decrease fair market value, however, 
by reducing the likelihood of improved local value in the event of holdouts. Conversely, if the 
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government expands its ability, then there will be an increased need to insure against the loss of 
subjective premium, which causes a decrease in fair market value. Such an effect will be 
counterbalanced by the positive effect on housing prices, given that homeowners expect an 
improvement in the surrounding area.  
Homeowners seeking protection against condemnation of their homes will 
simultaneously harm the value of their assets by advocating for such an outcome. The only way 
in which they can guarantee that they will avoid negatively impacting their home prices through 
advocacy is if eminent domain is inefficiently used. 
 
PART II: PRICING EFFECTS OF KELO V. CITY OF NEW LONDON AND SUBSEQUENT STATE 
RESPONSES 
In this Part, we apply the condemnation risk discount and relevant real estate market theories 
to Kelo and the subsequent state responses in this Part. We first conceptualize Kelo as an 
information flare-up and signal for unsteady legal landscapes. We then review the varying state 
responses to Kelo and anticipate the effect on housing prices.  
 
A. Kelo v. City of New London 
The most widely-known information flare-up is Kelo v. City of New London, where the 
Supreme Court upheld the City of New London’s economic revitalization project as a public use 
within the meaning of the Takings Clause. While the decision caused an explosively negative 
public reaction, it did not necessarily represent a change in the law. The Stevens-led majority 
concluded that the City’s development plan embodied a “public purpose” because “our cases 
have defined that concept broadly, reflecting our longstanding policy of deference to legislative 
judgments in this field.”54 In particular, the Court relied heavily on the 1984 decision Hawaii 
Housing Authority v. Midkiff,55 where the Court upheld a Hawaii statute that authorized the 
transfer of fee title from lessors to lessees to combat concentrated land ownership.56 
Interestingly (although unsurprisingly), Midkiff did not cause a reaction anywhere nearly 
as explosive as what followed Kelo. The Hawaii statute was targeted specifically at breaking up 
the concentrated land wealth of very large landowners on the islands.57 The Hawaiian legislature 
sought to force wealthy landowners to transfer ownership to longstanding property tenants. 
Homeowners were unable to relate to Hawaii’s unique concerns and, moreover, could not 
identify with the condemnees. By contrast, the American home-owning public could appreciate 
the distress caused to the City of New London condemnees when they were pushed aside for a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 480. 
55 467 U.S. 229 (1984) 
56 Id. at 233.  
57 Id. at 232. (“In the mid–1960's, after extensive hearings, the Hawaii Legislature discovered that, while the State 
and Federal Governments owned almost 49% of the State's land, another 47% was in the hands of only 72 private 
landowners. The legislature further found that 18 landholders, with tracts of 21,000 acres or more, owned more than 
40% of this land and that on Oahu, the most urbanized of the islands, 22 landowners owned 72.5% of the fee simple 
titles. The legislature concluded that concentrated land ownership was responsible for skewing the State's residential 
fee simple market, inflating land prices, and injuring the public tranquility and welfare.”) 
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redevelopment plan. In fact, following Kelo, t-shirts were sold with the slogan: “You Could Be 
Next: End Eminent Domain Abuse.”58 
Some scholars interpreted the overwhelming national response to Kelo as largely 
irrational, given that the decision did not create any new law.59 Kelo may not have represented a 
change in the law, but it was a vital signal to homeowners. Justice O’Connor anticipated in her 
Kelo dissent that the decision would necessarily have an impact on the real estate market. “The 
specter of condemnation hangs over all property,” she warned. 60  “Nothing is to prevent the 
State from replacing any Motel 6 with a Ritz–Carlton, any home with a shopping mall, or any 
farm with a factory.”61 On a purely local level, it was an indication that the State of Connecticut 
and City of New London were able and willing to withstand enormous political pushback 
because their condemnation power was so strong. However, the reason a distinctly local case 
would cause an increase in condemnation risk discounts and, in turn, decrease home price is 
because it created an unsteady legal landscape. With such an unequivocal pronouncement from 
the Supreme Court, homeowners could not be certain whether the decision would motivate local 
governments to flex their eminent domain powers without as much uncertainty over federal 
judicial backlash.62  
We expect a negative effect on fair market value given the media coverage over Kelo at 
the time, even though Table 1 indicates that either right-hand boxes could be in play. With the 
potential for local governments to follow the City of New London’s lead, there was uncertainty 
over the likelihood of an increase in the potential for large development projects via eminent 
domain. In theory, the possibility of redevelopment should have caused a converse, positive 
effect on the housing market; however, the media coverage at and after the Kelo decision was 
strongly negative against eminent domain. Private transfers via eminent domain were described 
as having “failed miserably” and examples of those failures were “not hard to find.”63  
 
B. Subsequent State Legislation  
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority in Kelo, emphasized that “nothing in our opinion 
precludes any State from placing further restrictions on its exercise of the takings power.”64 
Forty-four states responded by enacting new or stronger legislation to protect homeowners 
against the risk of a taking. The vast majority of states responded swiftly but with varying 
degrees of aggressiveness.  
Six states65 have chosen not to respond legislatively to the Kelo decision. While evidence 
is limited, the available literature suggests that these states are highly active in their eminent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 The Zazzle T-Shirt Online Store on behalf of EndDomainAbuse, available at 
http://www.zazzle.com/eminentdomainabuse (last visited February 28, 2014) (“You Could Be Next ~ End Eminent 
Domain Abuse...features a huge orange X that was marked on the door of a home taken by Eminent Domain.”). 
59 Lopez, et al., Pass a Law, Any Law, Fast! State Legislative Responses to the Kelo Backlash, 5 Rev. L. & Econ. 
101, 101 (2009) (noting that “the Kelo ruling in June 2005 created no new law”). 
60 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 503. 
61 Id. 
62 This is not to say that state supreme courts did not put in their own restrictions. See Judicial and Legislative 
Variables, p. 15. 
63 Norquist, at 7. 
64 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 488. 
65 Arkansas, Hawaii, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, and Oklahoma.  
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domain usage.66 Fifteen states67 made nominal changes to their eminent domain legislation, but 
generally are not considered as having made any significant substantive change. Some of these 
states left open space for eminent domain by including “obsolete” properties as available for 
eminent domain action.68 Similarly, they kept the definition of public use general to keep local 
governments flexible in using eminent domain. 
The remaining states engaged in substantive reform.69 The relative strength of reform is 
measured by looking at the degree to which the law forecloses the possibility of eminent domain 
for private transfer. Those states that prohibited private transfers through eminent domain in 
constitutional amendments are understood as having taken the most aggressive approach to 
Kelo.70 The majority of aggressive states did not go so far as amending their constitutions, but 
nevertheless took strong stances through statutory reform. They ensured that there were no or 
few openings in the definition of blight to circumvent the broad prohibitions against private 
transfers through eminent domain. Indiana, for example, prohibits private transfers and ensures 
that blight is narrowly defined, but it maintains an exception for certified technology parks.71 
Indiana has sought to ensure that technology business was not dissuaded from growing in the 
state.72 
The aggressive state responses signaled an increase in friction against private economic 
development through eminent domain. Florida is known as one of the states that provided some 
of the most aggressive protections in response to Kelo. Shortly after the ruling, Florida passed a 
law requiring local governments to wait 10 years before transferring land through eminent 
domain.73  The state legislature and voters passed a constitutional amendment that requires a 
three-fifths majority in both the house and senate to permit an exception to using eminent 
domain for private development.74 Florida’s laws, according Institute for Justice, “effectively 
eliminat[e] condemnations for private commercial development.”75 Though such reactions 
should decrease home buyers’ condemnation risk discounts and thereby increase home sale 
prices, we argue it should also decrease homes’ fair market value in theory. Once again, the 
empirical effects are difficult to anticipate theoretically, given that either one of Table 1’s left-
hand boxes may be triggered.76  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Yun-chien Chang, An Empirical Study of Compensation Paid in Eminent Domain Settlements: New York City, 
1990-2002, 39 J. Legal Stud. 201 (2010).  
67 Idaho, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, Nebraska, Alaska, Connecticut, Maryland, Missouri, Montana, Ohio, California, 
Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Vermont.  
68 See, for example, Alabama Senate Bill 68 (2005). The state legislature eventually tightened the definition of 
blight in House Bill 654 (2006). 
69 Id. 
70 Florida, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Virginia. 
71 Indiana House Bill 1010 (2006). 
72 Indiana Certified Technology Parks, Indiana: A State That Works, available at http://iedc.in.gov/programs-
initiatives/indiana-certified-technology-parks (last visited November 8, 2013).  
73 Florida House Bill 1567. 
74 Florida House Joint Resolution 1569.  
75 The Castle Coalition, at 11. 
76 While our analysis focuses on state and local responses—which represent the substantial portion of condemnation 
activity—the federal government also maintains the right to eminent domain under the Fifth Amendment. In recent 
history, the federal government has used eminent domain through the Department of Justice’s Land Acquisition 
Section to further conversation efforts in, for example, the Florida Everglades and New Mexico’s Valles Caldera 
National Preserve. Additional projects have included the condemnation of land along the United States-Mexico 
border for national security interests 
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It is important to understand that a state’s response might affect homeowners’ and 
buyers’ valuation for a given property due to a belief bias. The belief bias in behavioral 
economics theorizes that a homeowner or buyer may use her own personal beliefs or potential 
prior knowledge about the state response to Kelo to determine the value of a given home. In 
particular, homeowners and buyers may have believed in the short run that stronger anti-Kelo 
legislation was better for the housing market, without consideration for the effects on the 
relevant real estate market. The short-run effect on housing prices may reflect that fact, without 
revealing competing negative effects.77 While any such bias may create short-run irrational 
responses, in the long run it will tend to disappear as the state response and its effects become a 
clear and set form of information.78 
 
C. Local Legislative Responses 
Local legislative activity occurred concurrently or, in some instances, in the absence of state 
legislative responses to Kelo. Many municipalities quickly passed resolutions condemning the 
Supreme Court’s decision and requesting responsive federal and state legislation.79 Dutchess 
County, New York, legislators, for example, passed Resolution No. 205257 to “set[ ] policy for 
the county and reassure[ ] constituents that property would not be taken by eminent domain for 
economic gain.”80 The resolution prohibited the county from exercising eminent domain for 
private transfer. While impassioned, “[t]he authority [ ] exercised in the resolution was to create 
county policy not law.”81 Dutchess County’s resolution and other resolutions passed in the wake 
of Kelo are properly understood as statements of policy and not binding law, similar to 
Congress’s anti-Kelo resolution.82 
Other localities passed ordinances—that function as local law, in contrast with resolutions—
with varying degrees of success.83 The uncertainty over the relationship between a municipality’s 
authority to pass legislation in the absence of state action or that is different from state legislation 
puts into doubt whether many of these ordinances are properly understood as valid laws.84 
Notably, in Amesbury, Massachusetts, voters passed Ordinance 2006-013 in an attempt to 
restrict eminent domain for private transfer, given the absence of successful legislation on the 
state level.85 In Massachusetts, however, the ordinance required the State Legislature’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Another factor that could create a belief bias was the simultaneous local legislation underway at the same time. 
See Local Legislative Responses, supra, p. 15. 
78 Jonathan Evans, Rationality and Reasoning (1996); Jonathan Evans & Jodie Curtis-Holmes, Rapid responding 
increases belief bias: evidence for the dual-process theory of reasoning, 11 Think. Reasoning 382 (2005); D. 
Torrens D, et. al., Individual differences and the belief bias effect: mental models, logical necessity, and abstract 
reasoning, 5 Think. Reasoning 28 (1999); Aydogan Alti & Paul Tetlock, Biased Beliefs, Asset Prices, and 
Investment: A Structural Approach, 69 J. Fin. 325 (2014). 
79 See, for example, County of Delaware, NY, Resolution 299 (2005) (on file with authors); City of Simi Valley, CA 
Memorandum (July 11, 2007) (“On May 8, 2006, the City Council adopted a resolution that prohibits the use of 
eminent domain to acquire real property designated or occupied for residential purposes for purposes other than 
right-of-way, public infrastructure, or public facilities.”) 
80 Minutes from Regular Board Meeting Of The Dutchess County Legislature (Sept. 19, 2005) (on file with authors). 
81 Interview with Shannon LaFrance, drafter and sponsor of Dutchess County Resolution No. 205257 (Feb. 6, 2014). 
82 US House Resolution 340 (109th Congress). 
83 See, for example, The Castle Coalition, Local Legislation on Eminent Domain, available at 
http://www.castlecoalition.org/legislativecenter/183?task=view (last visited February 28, 2014). 
84 See generally Dale Krane, et. al., Home Rule in America: A Fifty-State Handbook,  203-11 (2000). 
85 Town of Amesbury, MA 2008 Annual Report; see also Memorandum to the Honorable Thatcher W. Kezer, III 
from Kopel & Paige, P.C., Apr. 24, 2006, Re Bill No. 2006-013-An Act to Limit Use of Eminent Domain.  
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approval.86 The Massachusetts Governor ultimately vetoed the petition.87 Massachusetts is 
generally known as a flexible state with respect to a municipality’s right to home rule, thereby 
casting doubt on the effectiveness of comparable laws in more restrictive states. 
Even where municipal legislation may have been effectively passed, there is varying strength 
among those ordinances. Newport Beach, California successfully amended its charter to include 
limitations on eminent domain, but created a sizeable loophole in stating: 
 
The City of Newport Beach and/or any City-affiliated agency shall not exercise the power of 
eminent domain to acquire any property from the owner of the property, without the owner’s 
consent, for the sole purpose of transferring the property to another person to further private 
economic development.88  
 
Consequently, the practical impact of the Newport Beach amendment and similar legislation is 
likely very small. 89 Most anti-Kelo municipal ordinances generally prohibited the use of eminent 
domain for private transfer, leaving gaps in the definition of private transfer and not touching 
blight definitions. We therefore interpret the majority of these ordinances as codifying a general 
pro-property rights sentiment.90  
 
PART III: EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
We saw in the previous section the theoretical analysis of the effect of Kelo and the 
subsequent state responses on the housing market. In this empirical section, we seek to (1) 
measure analytically the importance of the Kelo decision on housing prices and (2) measure how 
the state responses to Kelo affected those prices. 
 
A. Data 
We built a dataset for all fifty states in the United States between the years 1997 and 2011. 
The database contains the Housing Price Index, gross domestic product, unemployment, total 
personal income, population, real estate earnings, income taxes, state building permit 
construction of non-residential buildings, poverty rates, state revenues, state debt, and state 
expenditures per state over the period of interest. 91 The dataset also contains information about 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 See Dale Krane, et. al., Home Rule in America: A Fifty-State Handbook,  203-11 (2000). 
87 Governor Veto Letter re House Bill No. 4583, “An Act Limiting Use of Eminent Domain in the Town Known as 
the City of Amesbury.” 
88 Newport Beach, CA Ord. 2006-12 § 1 (part), 2006 (emphasis added). 
89 Ilya Somin reached similar conclusions about state level activity, see Ilya Somin, Political Backlash to Kelo, 93 
Minn. L. Rev. 2100, 2103 (2009) (finding that the “majority of newly-enacted post-Kelo reform laws are likely to be 
ineffective”). 
90 See, for example, Wasilla, AK Ord. 05-78 § 2, 2005 (“The city may exercise the powers of eminent domain and 
declaration of taking in the performance of an authorized power of function of the city, in accordance with AS 
09.55.240 through 09.55.460; provided, that the city may exercise the powers of eminent domain or declaration of 
taking to acquire property only if the city will own, or if the public will have the legal right to use, the property, and 
the city may not exercise the powers of eminent domain or declaration of taking to provide property for private 
economic development. The exercise of the power of eminent domain or declaration of taking shall be by resolution 
of the council.”) 
91	  Our main analysis will include HPI, Kelo variables, GDP, unemployment, total personal income, rental earnings, 
poverty line, and permit building construction.  The other variables do not affect or change our results.	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the states’ responses to Kelo: we report the state grade of the Kelo response, whether or not the 
law was the result of a citizen initiative, and whether or not the veto by the governor of a given 
state was overruled. We also report the potential existence of multiple responses to Kelo, given 
that some states have experienced more legislative activity in response to Kelo than others. 
Description of the data is discussed in greater detail in the following subparts. 
i. Housing Price Index 
We collected data on the Housing Price Index (HPI) from the Federal Housing Finance 
Agency from 1997 to 2011, both yearly and quarterly.92 The HPI is a broad measure of the 
movement of single-family house prices.  “The HPI is a weighted, repeat-sales index. It 
measures the average price changes in repeat sales or refinancing on the same properties. This 
information is obtained by reviewing repeat mortgage transactions on single-family properties. 
The HPI is known as an accurate indicator of house price trends at the state level.  It provides 
more information than any other house price indexes.”93 The index controls for any particular 
variation of housing determinants and minimizes the heteroskedasticity in the variance of the 
error terms.94 
ii. Judicial and Legislative Variables 
The Kelo decision is assigned a dummy variable that takes a value of one for the two 
quarters following the decision’s publication on June 25, 2005.95 The opinion was released at the 
end of the second quarter of 2005, so the third and fourth quarters of that year are grouped 
together to reflect the short-run effect of Kelo. This approach controls for any time lags in 
education among the population about the opinion, and is justified by the national surveys taken 
in the third quarter of 2005 to assess the public’s reaction.96 
We reviewed indices created97 or suggested98 by others before constructing a novel index 
to represent the strength of each state’s legislative response to Kelo (2005-2011). The Castle 
Coalition established a comprehensive fifty-state grading scheme to evaluate state legislative 
activity. The Castle Coalition is a pro-property rights organization founded in 2002 to combat 
“eminent domain abuse,” and is the Institute for Justice’s “nationwide grassroots property rights 
activism project.”99 The Castle Coalition provides a grade (A through F) to each state according 
to its legislative response to Kelo. The Castle Coalition’s grading scheme, while thorough, fails 
to include the role of the judiciary in forming a state’s eminent domain legal landscape. In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 Federal Housing Finance Agency, Housing Price Index, available at http://www.fhfa.gov (last visited February 28, 
2014).  
93 Id.  
94 See, for example, M.J. Bailey, et. al., A Regression Method for Real Estate Price 
Index Construction, 58 J. Am. Stat. Ass’n 933 (1963); B. Case, et. al., On Choosing Among House Price Index 
Methodologies, 19 Am. Real Est. & Urb. Econ. Ass’n J. 286 (1991); K.E. Case & R.J. Shiller, The Efficiency of the 
Market for Single Family Homes, 79 Am. Econ. Rev. 125 (1989). 
95  545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
96 The Zogby Survey (American Farm Bureau Survey) was taken in October 29 to November 2, 2005.  The Saint 
Index Poll (Center for Economic and Civic Opinion, University of Massachusetts/Lowell) was taken in October – 
November 2005. See Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, Property Rights: 
Eminent Domain and Regulatory Takings Re-examined, ed. Bruce L. Benson, 104 (2010).  
97 The Castle Coalition, available at http://www.castlecoalition.org/about (last visited February 28, 2014). 
98 See generally Somin, 93 Minn. L. Rev. at 2100. 
99 The Castle Coalition, available online at http://www.castlecoalition.org/about (last visited February 28, 2014). 
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addition, their grading scheme also does not adjust as the laws change over time. The Castle 
Coalition released a 50 State Report Card in August 2007 with its grades at that point in time. It 
also has an active website that grades the states based on their most recent legislative changes. 
Many states passed one law prior to August 2007, such that the grade they were given in the 
Castle Coalition’s original report remains the same. Some states passed one law after August 
2007.100  
Given the Castle Coalition’s potential bias, we could not rely on their grades.  We 
consequently were compelled to create an original index. Our index is similarly predicated on a 
4.0 grade scale, but is based on the risk that eminent domain will be used for private transfer 
without any comment on whether the state uses eminent domain efficiently or inefficiently. If a 
state fails to respond to Kelo, it is given a failing grade, based on the assumption that voters 
expected some form of legislative response as an assurance that eminent domain would not be 
used for private benefit.101  Legislative responses are awarded an above-failing grade depending 
on whether they address two issues, and the extent to which they address them: (1) the definition 
of blight102, and (2) the explicit prohibition of eminent domain for private transfer. A perfect 
score (4.0) requires a constitutional amendment that prohibits private transfer and restricts blight 
to safety hazards for all homeowners. A constitutional amendment is the strongest legislative 
protection due to the difficulty in changing it in the future. State intervention that closes one 
opening (blight or economic development) but leaves the other open is given a low grade (2.75 
or 2.5) depending on the strength of the closed route. States that close both routes for the 
majority (but not all) of residents are given a relatively high grade (3.0-3.5). Depending on the 
state, multiple grades may be assigned over the time period 1997-2011 as states might have 
passed multiple laws. 
 We treat judicial intervention as a substitute for legislative action. Four supreme state 
courts made significant anti-Kelo rulings since 2005: South Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, and New 
Jersey.103 The South Dakota ruling, though strong, had no effect on the data set because the 
opinion was entered on January 24, 2006 and the South Dakota constitutional amendment was 
passed on February 17, 2006, both within the first quarter of that year. New Jersey and 
Oklahoma’s judicial response was given a 0.7 score because it left open blight. By contrast, 
Ohio’s judicial response was sufficiently strong to warrant a 3.3 grade.104  
As discussed above, there was some legislative activity on the municipal level following 
Kelo, but we exclude those effects for purposes of our empirical analysis. Empirically, there are 
too few municipalities that passed ordinances to have an impact on the quarterly or annual HPI at 
the state level. On a theoretical basis, there are two general scenarios that occurred. First, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 For example, Minnesota is a trouble state for purposes of the Castle Coalition grade. In 8/2007 Report card, it is 
given a B-. In the most recent iteration, it is given a B. However, in the intervening years, the law has actually 
weakened.  
101 See, for example, New York. 
102 See Somin, 93 Minn. L. Rev. at 2120 (noting that “Sixteen states have enacted post-Kelo reform laws whose 
effect is largely negated by exemptions for blight condemnations under definitions of blight that make it possible to 
include almost any property in that category”). 
103 Gallenthin Realty, 191 N.J. 344 (2007); Norwood v. Horney, 853 N.E.2d 1115 (Ohio 2006); Muskogee County v. 
Lowery, 136 P.3d 639 (Okla. 2006); Benson v. State, 710 N.W.2d 131 (S.D. 2006).   
104 The Supreme Courts of Hawaii, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Missouri issued rulings after Kelo, but given 
that their decisions were based largely on evidentiary standards, they do not qualify for our index system. See 
County of Hawaii v. C&J Coupe Family Ltd. Publ’n, 198 P.3d 615 (Haw. 2008); Middletown Twp. v. Lands of 
Stone, 939 A.2d 331 (Penn. 2007); Rhode Island Econ. Dev. Corp. v. The Parking Co., 892 A.2d 87 (R.I. 2006); 
Centene Plaza Redev. Corp. v. Mint Props., 225 S.W.3d 431 (Mo. 2007). 
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state enacted relatively stronger anti-Kelo legislation but local governments maintained weak 
laws on their books. In that case, the local governments are bound by the stricter state 
requirements on the basis of state preemption of local laws.105 Second, the state enacted 
relatively weak anti-Kelo legislation but local governments enacted stronger laws. In that case, 
our empirical results of the effect of relative strength of a state’s law is, in fact, a lower bound, 
given that even where there are weak state laws, there may have been stronger protections in 
some municipalities. 
 
iii. Additional Controls 
We collected data on gross domestic product on a yearly basis from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis between 1997 and 2011.  We retrieved yearly and quarterly unemployment 
rate from the Bureau of Labor Statistic over the period 1997-2011.  In addition, we collected 
yearly and quarterly data on total personal income per state from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis over the period 1997-2003. Personal income represents the income received by all 
persons of the state from all sources during each year or quarter. Personal income is the 
calculated as the sum of net earnings by place of residence, property income, and personal 
current transfer receipts.106   
We considered the annual poverty rate by state yearly between 1997 and 2011 from 
Census data. We also controlled for yearly building permits per state over the same period 1997-
2011 using Census data. The building permit construction data covers all "permit-issuing 
places," which are jurisdictions that issue building or zoning permits within the states.107 This 
data is helpful for controlling the state’s participation in the real estate market on a yearly basis.  
We also use in-state governments’ expenditures data from the Census bureau during the years 
1997-2011.  We consider the state revenue, state expenditure, and state debt during that same 
time period.  We also added the real estate, rental and leasing earnings per state and quarter for 
1997-2011 to take into account potential substitutions between owning and renting from the 
Census Bureau. We also get the population for each state using Census Bureau data. 
To make sure our analysis is not affected by the early 2000s’ housing bubble and the 
2008 financial crisis, we use state and year fixed effects. State and year fixed effects ensure that 
our analysis controls for potential differing effects of a given crisis in a state at a particular point 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 See, for example, Robert W. Bower, Jr., Home Rule and the Preemption Doctrine: The Relationship Between 
State and Local Government in Maine, 37 Maine L. Rev. 313, 348-51 (1985). 
106 Note that personal income is measured before the deduction of personal income taxes and other personal taxes 
and is reported in current dollars (no adjustment is made for price changes). To control for the potential effect of 
taxes, we collected the taxes on production and imports yearly over the period 1997-2011.  These tax data are 
collected from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. These taxes consist mainly of general sales and property taxes.  
They are measured in millions of dollars. 
107 As the Census Bureau indicates, “zoning permits are used only for areas that do not require building permits but 
require zoning permits. Areas for which no authorization is required to construct a new privately-owned housing 
unit are not included in the survey.”  See Census Bureau, Construction, available at 
http://www.census.gov/construction/bps/about_the_surveys/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2014). 
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in time.108 We can therefore reliably examine the impact of the Kelo decision on the index price 
index in the following section; then we will turn to the effect of the response to Kelo. 109 
The following table (Table 1) shows the summary statistics of our sample. 
 
Table 1: Sample Statistics 
	  
 
 
B. Estimation of the Impact of Kelo on Housing Prices 
We will first estimate the direct impact of Kelo on the change in housing prices using a 
quarterly dataset. We will then test if the state response to Kelo had a sizeable effect on the real 
estate market for each states during the post-Kelo period. 
To directly measure the impact of Kelo on the change in house prices index, we consider the 
following model: 
ΔHPIit =α Kit +β Xit +εit . 
ΔHPIit  is the quarterly change in housing price index in state i at time t. Kit  is a discrete 
variable indicating Kelo in state i at time t (for the quarterly data the value 1 for K corresponds to 
the third and fourth quarters of the year 2005 to highlight the fact that the surveys and 
application of the Kelo decision would be best reflected in the prices of houses sold after the 
decision and that it usually takes an average of around three months).   It is important to use the 
change in housing price index to measure the change in real estate prices between period. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 See, for example, Jeffrey M. Wooldridge, Econometric Analysis of Cross-Section and Panel Data (2002); Colin 
Cameron and Pravin K. Trivedi, Microeconometrics: Methods and Applications (2005); A Goyal & P. Santa-Clara, 
Idiosyncratic Risk Matters!, 58 J. Fin. 975 (2003). 
109	  We also use a cross-effect variable multiplying state and time specific dummies as a robustness check.  Our 
results remain unchanged.	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 represents the matrix of covariates (GDP, unemployment, construction, personal income, 
poverty rates, rental earnings, that were developed in the previous section of the paper) and a 
constant.  As mentioned earlier, all specifications include year fixed-effects and state fixed-
effects to make sure we control for any potential state and year specific swings in the housing 
market.  We add a robustness check by crossing the state and time effect in our model to better 
capture the effect of any potential shock in a given state during a period of time.  In other words 
we control for any and all effects of the recession and the housing crisis or the pre-recession 
bubble. 
Table 2: Regression Results with Pooled OLS (Time and State FE)110 
 
	  
	  
We see in Table 2 that the results of the regression seem to indicate that Kelo had a 
potential negative and significant (but small) effect of the change in the housing price index over 
time, irrespective of the specification. The coefficient is -1.57, reflecting that the expected 
difference between a pre and post Kelo average price home in a given state would be discounted 
by 1.57% if we were holding all of the other potential determinants of the change in HPI 
constant.  This effect is all the more emphasized by the difference over the entire period 1997-
2011 pre- and post Kelo by a similar negative impact of -1.57 in the change in a given state’s 
HPI holding everything else constant. All of these results show that Kelo, despite being only a 
reaffirmation of the existing law, contributed to a statistically significant decrease (albeit very 
small) in the change of housing prices in the real estate market in any state over the post-Kelo 
era.111 
 
We also ran a similar regression using fixed effects to control for the effects of time-
invariant variables with time-invariant effects.  We find the following results in Table 3.  
 
Table 3: Regression Results with Fixed Effects (Time and State FE)112 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 Correcting for potential heteroskedasticity. 
111 These results are also robust to a tighter quarter state fixed effects. 
112 Correcting for potential heteroskedasticity. 
itX
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Note that we obtain similar results when we consider the fixed effect estimator.  Kelo had 
a negative significant effect on the change in HPI.  It leads to a decrease of -1.57 in the change of 
HPI, controlling for the determinants of the housing pricing.113  
Overall our empirical analysis of the effect of Kelo shows that we are not in the top left 
corner of our Table 1 presenting the eminent domain trade-offs: the negative effect of Kelo 
seems to show that the effect of condemnation risk discount value and of the relevant real estate 
market could not be both positive right after Kelo.  Based on the fact that the decision reinforced 
some negative priors for both the market and the risk of condemnation, we expect that the 
bottom left of our matrix best reflects the short-run environment. 
 
C. Estimation of the Impact of State Responses to Kelo on Housing Prices 
In the previous section we showed on a panel dataset that Kelo had a small significant 
negative effect on HPI for states over the period 1997-2011.  As a result of Kelo, some states 
enacted laws to provide their constituents with a commitment not to increase eminent domain 
usage, at diverse levels of efficacy.  We use panel data analysis in this section to understand the 
potential effects of the strength of the state laws in the post-Kelo world on the housing price 
index.  
We consider the effect of the grades that we constructed and assigned to each state from the 
time period those laws, if any was passed in a given state, were implemented, and a range of 
control variables on the HPI real estate index change: 
 
ΔHPIit =α Gradesit +β Xit +λt +θi +εit , 
where i indexes represent states and t represents time.  The years considered, as they are 
responses to Kelo are 2005-2011. 
The left-hand side is the change in house price index as in the precedent regression, per 
state and time period (yearly or quarterly).  Our measure of grades is taken from the grades from 
our index. The control variables are the same as the ones in the previous section (GDP, 
unemployment, construction, personal income, poverty rates, rental earnings, and a constant). 
We include state and time fixed effects.  All regressions are weighted least squares with weights 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 We tested for potential heteroskedasticity for the fixed effect model, using a modified Wald test.  We concluded 
that heteroskedasticity was present and controlled for it in our analysis. 
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based on state populations.  All of the estimates in the table are adjusted for potential serial 
correlation in the panel data.  The summary statistics are presented in Table 4. 
 
 
Table 4: Sample Statistics After Kelo 
We notice that around 71% of our sample made an intervention against Kelo with different 
degrees of severity against it.  Of those, the average state grade is 2.36 with a variance of 1.13.  
Note that in our summary table above, as it includes the failing grades, the overall response 
grades were on average low, with a 1.69 mean. 
We show in Table 5 the pooled OLS results of the regression of the state grades on the 
change in the HPI.  The grades are from the highest (4.0) to the lowest (0.0). We control for 
potential heteroskedasticity of our data.  We also have some controls for each year and each state 
to make sure that we tease out the effect of any potential housing or financial crisis during the 
period when the grades were set.  We also ran a robustness check by using quarter and state 
specific fixed effects.   
The empirical analysis indicates that in a post-Kelo world, the higher a state legislation’s 
grade, the greater the decrease in a change in HPI, on average. Specifically, an increase in one 
GPA point leads to a decrease of -1.14 in the change in HPI on average, holding everything else 
constant. This result means that, on average, the better protection a state law offers, the more the 
HPI suffers as a consequence. The empirics are consistent with the eminent domain trade-off 
discussed in Part II (supra) and establish that the market interprets private transfer via eminent 
domain to have a positive expected value on housing prices, condemnation risk discount 
notwithstanding. Homeowners integrate the relative lost opportunity for a better surrounding 
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neighborhood using eminent domain if a state tries to commit itself to protect homeowners 
against any risk of condemnation.  
 
 
 
Table 5: Regression Results with Pooled OLS (Time and State FE)114 
 
In order to fully confirm this result we used a fixed effect regression with robustness 
adjustments to check if our results were consistent.  The same effect is found in the fixed effect 
regression as reported in Table 6 below.  
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Regression Results with Fixed Effects Panel Data (Time and State FE)115 
 
We find that in the post-Kelo world, stronger protection against the states seems to lead to 
potential decreases in the change in HPI, i.e. the level of price of the real estate within a state is 
subject to less variation than in a state that has a clear protection against Kelo. 
In addition, we investigated further the potential gap between the two extreme cases, 
where no law was passed as a response and the ones that had the strongest of responses: post-
Kelo, the states that passed the most aggressive laws had a smaller negative change in HPI when 
compared to those states that passed low-protection laws. Thus, there is a clear divide between 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 Correcting for potential heteroskedasticity. 
115 Correcting for potential heteroskedasticity. 
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the two extreme cases, which again indicates the inevitable trade-offs between condemnation 
risk discount and relevant real estate market value.  
 
When we consider the effect of each particular grade by grouping grades into five groups 
by strength (3.75 to 4.0, 3.0 to 3.75, etc.) we have some other revealing results: States with a 
good to average grade (2.75 to 3.5)—that is, with some form of commitment on challenging the 
law but not a total commitment—see on average a greater decrease in HPI (-2.16) compared to 
the states with low grades (0.0 or 0.75 grades), significant at the 95% level of confidence. The 
effect is even stronger when we consider only the failing grades: A failing grade leads to an 
increase in HPI of 1.32, significant at the 90% level of confidence. Grades that are 3.0 on 
average lead to a decrease in -2.22 in the change in HPI. The other grades do not have as 
significant of an effect.  
Low to failing grades (0 to 2.75) lead to an overall increase in the difference in HPI 
change of 1.89 compared to the higher grades (3.0 to 4.0).  It shows our conjecture that higher 
grades, originally seen as a better protection against the condemnation risk, potentially decrease 
the confidence (and therefore prior) of potential buyers or sellers due the lack of potential growth 
in the relevant real estate market.  Moderate responses to Kelo provide more leeway for states to 
adjust to a downward sloping neighborhood quality. With a strong protection the state is left out 
of levers to make needed adjustments over time. 
We also considered the determinants of a given response based on the characteristics of a 
given state.  A strong response usually happens with states where rental earnings have a negative 
effect and where personal income has a positive effect.  An average response usually happens in 
states with negative rental earnings but also negative personal income, positive GDP levels, and 
positive effect of unemployment levels. A weak response (0.75 or below) has the complete 
opposite characteristics: rental earnings are positive, personal income is positive, and 
unemployment is negative. 
 If we take into account the other determinants of a state’s decision on post-Kelo 
legislative development, notably passage of subsequent legislation, the origin of the law 
(politician or citizen-initiative), and the potential for governor veto, we find that are results are 
consistent with the previous regression results.  
We use a probit estimation to determine significant triggers of a state response to Kelo.  
Our estimation of the determinants of a state response to Kelo gave two main indicators as the 
increased probability of a state response: the rate of unemployment and the poverty level.  Both 
those indicators seem to be consistent with the general complaint about how eminent domain is 
used relatively more in low-income areas than in high income areas.  We find that an increase of 
1% of the unemployment rate raises the probability of a state response by 4% and that the 
poverty rate raises it by 1.8%.  It relates to the fact that the probability of condemnation is 
usually seen as higher in areas where economic development is needed. 
Another important component of our research was to analyze the effect of the potential 
veto overrule by the governor of a specific state or whether or not the response to Kelo resulted 
from a citizen initiative within the state.  Even if the amount of data is fairly small (1 veto 
overrule and 17 citizen initiative), we find that the state grade still has a negative effect on the 
change in HPI, at -0.83 and that these variables have an insignificant effect.  It may be due to the 
small sample effect in our data of these variables. 
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D. Discussion and Implications 
The empirical results suggest that Kelo had a negative effect on the change in house 
prices.  The expected decrease of one point of the change in the housing price index due to 
Kelo’s information flare-up is fairly consistent with the low probability of seizure happening 
overall in the states. This result is consistent with our subjective premium and relevant real estate 
market theories. Kelo caused an increase in condemnation risk discounts and, therefore, a 
decrease in fair market value. During this period, homeowners anticipated that the likelihood of 
condemnation increased and updated their condemnation risk discounts at a higher level to 
provide themselves greater intertemporal price transfers.   
Given that the overall effect of Kelo is negative, it suggests two possible underlying 
mechanisms within the relevant real estate market. Kelo may have caused a negative effect on 
fair market value if the market interpreted eminent domain as an inefficiently exercised tool. 
Even if the market interpreted eminent domain as positive or neutral such that Kelo caused an 
increase in fair market value, we argue, those effects were outweighed by the impact on 
condemnation risk discounts.  
Turning now to the state responses, the effect of the response to Kelo by the states on 
market price can be understood as the sum of both the negative effect of condemnation risk 
discount and the relevant real estate market on the change in house prices. Our analysis yields 
the interesting result that the states’ legislative reactions against Kelo may have further decreased 
the change in prices of the houses for the strongest state laws. It makes intuitive sense that those 
states with the strongest protection against private transfer experienced the greatest decrease in 
house prices. Strong anti-Kelo legislation constrain local governments from making 
improvements to the relevant real estate market in the face of holdouts or other impediments to 
organic economic development.  Alternatively, states with no real response to Kelo experienced 
an increase in the change in house prices, which demonstrates that their markets integrated the 
potential positive effects of private transfer via eminent domain. 
Our empirical results reflect long-term effects of Kelo and state legislation on the change 
in overall state house prices. As a consequence, any short-run behavioral biases—notably the 
ambiguity or belief biases previously identified—are smoothed out of the market for purposes of 
our discussion.116  
Having empirically shown the market’s sensitivity to the likelihood of condemnation for 
private transfer, we recommend that the market failures identified in this paper be corrected 
through improved information. Specifically, state and local governments should make readily 
available data on the usage of eminent domain for private transfer. Such data will allow 
homeowners to more accurately estimate the likelihood of condemnation, thereby avoiding 
reliance on the weak information provided by news coverage and changing legislation. Though 
more challenging, further research should be done into the marginal effect of eminent domain on 
large-scale redevelopment projects. Despite the highly politicized nature of the topic, the market 
would benefit from clarity on whether eminent domain increases the likelihood of successful 
large-scale redevelopment projects.  
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  Even in the short-run, we expect similar results despite the existence of ambiguity or belief biases. Those biases 
may create modest short-run fluctuations consistent with our results. In essence, the markets still clear but at a price 
that reflect those biases.	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CONCLUSION 
 Justice O’Connor’s fear that the “specter of condemnation hangs over all property” has 
been empirically shown. State and local governments are encouraged to correct for the market 
failures that have been caused by the housing market’s lack of reliable information about the 
usage and efficiency of eminent domain. Not only will such information assuage the fear of 
many opponents of eminent domain that private transfers are susceptible to poor planning and 
corruption, but it will also help stabilize the housing market in response to potential legislative 
and judicial changes in the future.  
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